Chapter XI
Endnotes
1. This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Maj. Toshiro Magari, Imperial Japanese Army. Duty assignments of this officer were as follows: Faculty, Japanese Military Academy, 7 Jul 41-10 Dec 42; Army Staff College, 10 DEC 42-31 Jul 44; Staff Officer (Operations), Thirteenth Army, 31 Jul 44-15 Aug 45. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.
2. Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Yearbook) Asahi Newspaper Co., Tokyo, Jun 46, p. 136.
3. Initial steps to combat the growing submarine menace to Japanese shipping were taken in the latter part of 1943. On 1 November, Fourteenth Army was ordered by Imperial General Headquarters to cooperate with the Navy in providing security for convoys in the waters adjacent to the Philippines by the assignment of Army aircraft to escort and patrol duty. On 15 November the Navy established the General Escort Command and launched serious study of measures to strengthen the convoy system and improve submarine detection devices. (1) U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 1946. Vol. II, pp. 440-1. (Interrogation of Capt. Atsushi Oi, Staff Officer (Operations), General Escort Command; and Comdr. Kiyoshi Sogawa, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section.) (2) Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Niki (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, p. 27. American Editor's Note: The success of American submarine "wolf-packs" in these waters was made possible largely by radio intercepts and prompt intelligence transmittal by coast-watcher teleradio stations established in the islands in increasing numbers despite severe Japanese counter-intelligence measures.
4. Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai, Sanki Dai Ikkan Hito ni okeru Dai Juyon Homengun no Sakusen Jumbi (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. I: Operational Preparations of the Fourteenth Area Army in the Philippines) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, p. 30.
5. (1) Hito Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Ni (Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 47, P- 37. (2) Statement by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Staff Officer (operations), First Mobile Fleet.
7. The various considerations which made the Philippines of central and primary importance in the formulation of Japan's defensive war plans in the summer of 1944 are set forth in the following interrogations made subsequent to the surrender by key staff officers of the Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters:
(1) Viewed from the standpoint of political and operational strategy, holding the Philippines was the one essential for the execution of the war against America and Britain. With the loss of these islands, not only would Japanese communications with the southern regions be severely threatened, but the prosecution of strategic policies within the southern regions as far as supply and reinforcements were concerned would be of paramount difficulty.... The islands were also essential and appropriate strategic bases for the enemy advance on Japan. After their capture, the advantage would be two to one in favor of the enemy.... (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief, 1st Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1944-5.)
(2) To shatter American war plans, the Army held it necessary to maintain the Philippines to the end and to fight a decisive battle with the Americans, who planned to recapture the islands. Furthermore, the Philippines were absolutely necessary to the security of traffic between Japan Proper and the southern area. (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief, 2d Bureau (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1942-5.)
(3) Japan recognized that the Philippines were important as a line of communications center on the route to the South Pacific and that they must be held at all costs. (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Hiroshi Nukada, Chief, Transport and Communications Bureau, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1943-5.)
(4) The Philippines were regarded as the supply distribution point for the occupied areas in Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Burma, Malaya, and New Guinea. They were also a key point in the chain which linked these areas with the homeland. In July 1944 these islands became the key defensive position. Retaining control of the Philippines was necessary to link the southern areas with Japan. (Interrogation of Col. Sei Matsutani, Chief, War Policies Board, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1943-4.)
(5) After the fall of Saipan, the Philippines became the last line of national defense. The major portion of the Fleet was committed at Leyte. This was considered the final stand, and the loss of the Philippines left no hope for the successful continuation of the war. (Interrogation of Rear Adm. Tasuku Nakazawa, Chief, 1st Bureau (Operations,) Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, 1943-4.)
8. (1) Daihonyei Rikugun Tosui Kiroku (Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46, p. 210. (2) Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
9. Slightly less probability was seen of a direct enemy invasion of Formosa or of the Ryukyu Islands, by-passing the Philippines. The homeland was rated third in order of probability, and the Kuriles last. (Ibid.)
10. (1) Hito Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Ichi (Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part I) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Aug 47, p. 7. (2) Statement by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
12. On 29 June 1942, following the completion of the campaign to occupy the Philippines, the Fourteenth Army was removed from the command of Southern Army and placed directly under Imperial General Headquarters. Cf. Chapter VI, p. 113.
13. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., p. 41.
14. (1) Ibid., p. 42. (2) Philippine Naval Operations Part I, op. cit., pp. 2, 6.
15. (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 53-4, 75. (2) File on reorganization of forces under 16th Group (Philippines). ATIS Bulletin No. 1631, 21 DEC 44, pp. 1-3.
16. Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Japan Yearbook 1943-44. Tokyo, DEC 44, pp. 1031-2.
17. The labor recruiting program lagged so badly that, in the summer of 1944, President Laurel issued a proclamation reminding the Filipinos that they were obligated by the treaty of alliance with Japan to cooperate in the execution of defense measures. Despite this reminder, results remained unsatisfactory. (Statement by Maj. Mikio Matsunobe, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Fourteenth Area Army.
18. Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section Report, Saikin ni okeru Hito Jijo (Recent Situation in the Philippines) 31 Mar 44, p.1.
19. The geographical locations of these sectors, and the respective leaders of the guerrilla forces in each, were as follows:
| 1st Battle Sector | North Luzon | Maj. Russell Volkmann |
| 2d Battle Sector | Pangasinan, Tarlca, Nueva Vizcaya | Maj. Robert B. Laphan |
| 3d Battle Sector | Bulacan, Pampanga, Zambales | Maj. Edwin Ramsey |
| 4th Battle Sector | Tayabas, Laguna, Batangas, Cavite | Capt. Bernard Anderson |
| 5th Battle Sector | Sorgosen, Camarines | Lt. Col. Salvador Escudero |
| 6th Battle Sector | Panay | Lt. Col. Macario Peralta |
| 7th Battle Sector | Negros | Lt. Col. Salvador Abcede |
| 8th Battle Sector | Cebu, Bohol | Col. James Cushing |
| 9th Battle Sector | Leyet, Samar | Maj. Gen. Ruperto Kangleon |
| 10th Battle Sector | Mindanao | Brig. Gen. Wendell Fertig |
Ibid., Table No. 7.
20. (1) Ibid., pp. 4-5. (2) Field Diary and Intelligence Reports, Iloilo Military Police Unit, 1-31 Aug 44. ADVATIS Translation Nos. 24, 25 DEC 44.
21. Recent Situation in the Philippines, op. cit., pp. 7-8. American Editor's Note: These operations were carried out by clandestine sections of General MacArthur's intelligence system, i. e., the A. I. B. (Allied Intelligence Bureau) and P. R. S. (Philippines Regional Section). See G-2 Historical Section, GHQ FEC, General Intelligence Series: Vol. I, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines" and Vol. II, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation."
23. Interrogation of Col. Shujiro Kobayashi, Chief, Operations Section, Fourteenth Area Army.
25. The 32d Division sailed from Shanghai in the Take convoy on 17 April together with the 35th Division destined for Western New Guinea. While the convoy was en route to Manila, Imperial General Headquarters suddenly decided to reassign the 32d Division to Second Area Army for the purpose of reinforcing Halmahera, and the division therefore did not disembark in the Philippines. On 28 April, an Imperial General Headquarters order formally transferred the 32d Division to Second Area Army and, in its place, assigned the 30th Division, then in Korea, to Fourteenth Army. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 230-1. (2) Dai Ni Homengun Dal Juyon Homengun Ido Hyo (Table of Movements of the Second and Fourteenth Area Armies).
26. (1) Nampo Gun Sakusen Kiroku (Southern Army Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Jul 46, pp. 136-8. (2) Statement by Col. Kazuo Horiba, Chief, Operations Section, Southern Army. (3) Nampo Gun Sakusen Keikaku Taiko (Outline Policy of Southern Army Operation Plan) 1 May 44.
27. The term "area of general decisive battle" was used in a dual sense. First, it denoted Southern Army's intention to commit virtually all its strength in the Philippines in the event of enemy invasion, even at the cost of abandoning its commitments on other fronts within the Army's zone of responsibility. For the Southern Army this was considered the final decisive battle. Second, it was intended to convey the strategic concept of the Philippines as an area in which the Army and Navy would completely coordinate their forces in a general decisive battle. This latter concept became the central principle of the Sho-Go Operation plans elaborated by Imperial General Headquarters in July. (Statement by Col. Horiba, previously cited.)
28. If, prior to an attack on the Philippines, the enemy launched offensive operations on the Burma front or against the Palembang area, the main strength of the Fourth Air Army, conversely, was to be shifted to the western front to reinforce the Third Air Army. Southern Army Operations Record, op. cit., p. 137.
29. Statement by Maj. Jiso Yamaguchi, Staff Officer (Operations), Southern Army.
30. (1) Statement by Col. Horiba, previously cited. (2) Fourteenth Army, in an earlier estimate submitted to Imperial General Headquarters in March, had placed troop requirements for securing the Philippines at a minimum of seven field divisions, with 24 additional infantry battalions to maintain public order and combat guerrilla Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., p. 60.
31. For this purpose, Fourth Air Army headquarters was to be moved back from Menado to the Philippines to effect a reorganization of the Army's component air groups, using reinforcements to be sent out gradually from the Homeland. Southern Army Operations Record, op. cit., p. 138.
32. Statement by Col. Horiba, previously cited.
33. Lt. Gen. Kuroda assumed command of Fourteenth Army on 19 May 1943.
34. The east coast of Mindanao was regarded, at this time, as a probable landing point in case of enemy invasion of the Philippines. The 30th Division was therefore ordered to deploy its troops in the Surigao area when the division arrived in the latter part of May. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Gyosaku Morozumi, Commanding General, 30th Division).
35. Cf. discussion of Combined Fleet preparations for the "A-Go" Operation, Chapter X.
36. Since early in 1944, the Navy had been preparing Tawitawi and Guimaras anchorages, in the Philippines, to accommodate major elements of the Combined Fleet in support of planned operations in the Marianas and Carolines areas. Preparations had also been started in March to establish facilities for accommodating command posts of the Combined Fleet and First Air Fleet at Davao. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
37. Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono San: Dai Juhachi Gun no Sakusen (Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Sep 46. Vol. III, pp.78-9.
38. Southern Army Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 161-2.
39. The 26th Air Flotilla was assigned to the First Air Fleet on 5 May but did not participate in the Philippine Sea Battle of 19-20 June. Ago Sakusen ("Ago" Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Aug 47, pp. 4, 20, 86-7.
40. Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 232.
41. Of the 30 Army airfields projected in October 1943, six had been generally completed by May 1944, and 24 under construction. Of the 21 projected Navy fields, 15 were still incomplete.
42. Each air base consisted of several airfields, each of which was an integral part of the base. The advantages of this arrangement were; (a) closer and more effective coordination of defense measures; (b) more concentrated and efficient use of air strength; (c) better command and maintenance facilities. Bases varied in size from those capable of accommodating a full air division down to bases which could accommodate half a division. Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. Cit., p. 206.
43. Hito Koku Sakusen Kiroku Dai Niki (Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 4-5.
44. The 6th and 10th Air Brigades of the 2d Air Division moved forward to the Philippines in June, followed by the 7th and 13th during July and August. The 2d Air Division also assumed command of the 22d Air Brigade, already in the Philippines. Report on reinforcements sent to the Philippines, prepared by the 1st Demobilization Bureau in reply to memorandum of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 27 Oct 45. Submitted 14 Nov 45.
45. The 4th Air Division, upon its arrival, was assigned the primary mission of executing part of the airfield construction program. Two air reconnaissance companies, with about 20 aircraft, were assigned to the division, however, and allocated to anti-submarine patrol duty.
46. The organization of these new divisions differed from the standard Japanese infantry division in that each had two infantry brigades made up of four independent infantry battalions, with an approximate over-all strength of 10,000 troops. Rikugun Butai Chosa Hyo (Table of Army Units) War Ministry, 28 Oct 45, Part I, pp. 36-8.
47. (1) Dairikumei Dai Sennijukyu-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1029) 15 Jun 44. (2) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 10-11.
48. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 259-60. (2) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 12.
49. Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Sanki Dai Nikan Furoku Reite Sakusen Kiroku (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. II, Supplement: Leyte Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 9-10.
50. (1) Dairikumei Dai Sennijuichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1021) 7 Jun 44. (2) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 27.
51. The other major elements of the First Air Fleet at the end of June were: 22d Air Flotilla, stationed on Truk; 23d Air Flotilla, which had been transferred from the control of the Southwest Area Fleet on 5 May and was deployed in the Ceram-Halmahera area; and the 26th Air Flotilla, which was still at Davao. The 62d Air Flotilla had been organized in Japan and assigned to the First Air Fleet early in 1944. Just before the Philippine Sea Battle in June, it was transferred temporarily to direct Combined Fleet command. "Ago," Operation, op. cit., pp. 11-14.
52. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., p. 30.
53. Southwest Area Fleet had previously made preparations to transfer its headquarters to Kendari, in the Celebes, or to Halmahera, in order to facilitate support of operations in Western New Guinea. With the invasion of Hollandia, however, these plans were cancelled in favor of a transfer to Manila. Ibid., pp. 28-9.
54. Gun Hoyu Sempaku Hendo ni kansuru Shuyo Jiko (Principal Matters Pertaining to Changes in Military Shipping) Shipping Division, General Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Transportation, 20 Jan 46.
55. Statement by Capt. (Navy) Oi, previously cited.
56. Beikoku Senryaku Bakugeki Chosa Oboegaki Dai Nijuyon-go ni taisuru Kaito (Reply to United States Strategic Bombing Survey Memorandum No. NAV-24) Navy Ministry, 26 Nov 45, Chart C.
57. USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 440-1. (Interrogations of Capt. Oi, and Comdr. Sogawa, both previously cited.)
58. Ibid., pp. 309-10. (Interrogation of Capt. Shunji Kamiide, Commander, 901st Air Group, Imperial Japanese Navy.)
59. General data regarding Imperial General Headquarters planning of the decisive battle operations were furnished by Col. Hattori, Col. Sugita, and Capt. Ohmae, all previously cited.
60. Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 251-2.
62. Since 1943 some fortification work had been done on airfields within the national defense sphere. Concrete revetments had been constructed to protect fuel and ammunition and control installations. Efforts were now renewed to complete this work in the Philippines. (Statement by Col. Sugita, previously cited.)
63. The Zuikaku, of about 29,800 tons, was the only regular carrier remaining. The Chiyoda, Chitose, Zuiho and Ryuho, all with an approximate tonnage of 14,000, had been converted from seaplane and submarine tenders and were classed as light carriers. The Junyo, 27,500 tons, was a converted merchant ship. The Ise and Hyuga, converted from battleships, had no flight decks and carried only 22 aircraft which were launched by catapult. (1) Kakukan Kozokuryoku To Ichiranhyo (Table Showing Radius of Action of Naval Ships) 2d Demobilization Bureau, 19 Jul 47, p. 3. (2) Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of the War, 2d Demobilization Bureau, Apr 47, p. 2.
64. The size, structure, and armament of the Musashi and Yamato were one of the Japanese Navy's most closely guarded secrets. The five other battleships of the fleet included two old, slow-speed ships, the Fuso and Yamashiro. The Fuso had participated in naval actions since early 1944 under direct Combined Fleet command. On 10 September, it was assigned together with the Yamashiro to the Second Battleship Division. Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p. 37.
65. Cf. Chapter XVII for detailed discussion of special attack tactics and organization.
66. Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 262-3.
67. Dairikumei Dal Senhachijuichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1081) 24 Jul 44.
68. Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 252-3.
69. (1) Ibid., pp. 254-8. (2) Daikaishi Dai Yonhyakusanjugo-go Bessatsu (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 435, Annex) 26 Jul 44.
70. The First Air Fleet had under its command the 15th Air Regiment (Army), which was attached on 16 May 1944 to assist in long-range reconnaissance. (1) Daikaishi Dai Sambyakushichijuku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 379) 16 May 44. (2) Teraoka Nikki (Diary of Vice Adm. Kimpei Teraoka) First Air Fleet Commander.
71. Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 253-4.
73. Much discussion had centered around the most desirable division of operational responsibility in the Philippines. In view of the political and strategic importance of Luzon, it was decided that one Army should control that key island. On the other hand, the central and southern Philippines not only were closely interrelated topographically but also were expected to be the target of the initial Allied invasion. Decision was therefore reached to assign the responsibility for securing that sector to another Army. Finally, Imperial General Headquarters concluded that it would be desirable to have a single headquarters maintain unified command over the entire Philippine area, thus retaining maximum flexibility in the employment of ground forces and facilitating necessary coordination between the air and ground forces. To fulfill this mission it was decided forthwith to raise the status of the Fourteenth Army to that of an Area Army with additional responsibility for the direct defense of Luzon. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 278-9. (2) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 63-4. (3) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 22-3.
74. The 1st Division, stationed in North Manchuria, was reorganized on 24 July and began moving to Shanghai on 20 August, completing its movement in early September. Dai Ichi Shidan Sakusen Kodo Gaiyo (Summary of Operations, 1st Division) Home Depot Bureau, 1 Mar 47, p. 6.
75. In addition to the provisions of the basic Sho-Go plan, an important amendment was inclusion of the Moluccas in the strategic scheme for the defense of the Philippines. Lt. Gen. Numata, who attended the 5 August conference, urgently recommended that this area be regarded as a vital outpost and appropriately reinforced, particularly with air contingents. This recommendation was adopted by the conference, and plans were subsequently made to furnish substantial air reinforcements to the Halmahera area. (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, Chief of Staff, Second Area Army.)
76. Nampo Gun Sakumei Ko Dai Hyakugoju-go (Southern Army Operations Order A, No. 150) 5 Aug 44.
77. Hito Homen Sakusen Shido no Taiko (Outline of Operational Policy Concerning the Philippine Area) 24 Aug 44.
78. Daikaishi Dai Yonhyakusanjuichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No.431) 21 Jul 44.
79 Daikaishi Dai Yonhyakusanjugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 435) 26 Jul 44.
80. These missions were set forth in a separate annex to the order. The original text of this annex is not available, but the essential portions paraphrased in this volume were reconstructed from the following sources: (1) Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 84, 1 Aug 44; Task Force Top Secret Operations Order No. 76, 10 Aug 44; Second Striking Force Top Secret Operations Order No. 1, 10 Aug 44. ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 39, Part VIII, 4 Jun 45, pp. 226-33; Part I, 22 APR 45, pp. 3-8; Part V, 28 May 45, pp. 5-11. (2) Philippine Naval Operations Part I, op. cit., pp. 14-19. (3) Statement by Comdr. Saku Mikami, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section.
81. ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 39, op. cit. Part VIII, pp. 227-33 and Part V, pp. 5-11.
82. Original text of the operational outline annexed to Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 85 is not available. The substance of this outline relating to surface force operations is given here on the same sources as listed in n. 80.
83. The outline further contained a paragraph regarding the employment of surface special attack forces. This paragraph provided that the use of such forces would be subject to direct control by Imperial General Headquarters, and that the latter would issue a special order for their employment in combat. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., p. 21.
84. (1) Daikairei Dai Sanjusan-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 33) 9 Aug 44. (2) Daikairei Dai Sanjugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 35) 21 Aug 44.
85. Concurrently with these military and naval preparations, steps were taken to assure coordinated action on the political and diplomatic fronts. An Imperial conference held on 19 August called for a thorough mobilization of national strength by the end of the current year and for decisive action to improve the Empire's diplomatic position. (Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.)
86. The 2d Air Division had 400 planes, and the 4th Air Division (mostly base maintenance personnel) about 20. The 7th Air Division operating in the Second Area Army zone had about 70 planes. The 6th Air Division had remained inoperational since losing its last strength at Hollandia and was finally deactivated on 19 August. (1) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 25-6. (2) Dairikumei Dai Senhyakugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1105) 19 Aug 44.
87. Principal units assigned to the 2d Air Division at the end of August were: 6th Air Brigade (65th and 66th Fighter-Bomber Regiments); 7th Air Brigade (12th and 62d Heavy Bomber Regiments); 10th Air Brigade (27th and 45th Fighter-Bomber Regiments); 13th Air Brigade (30th and 31st Fighter Regiments); 22d Air Brigade (17th and 19th Fighter Regiments); 2d Air Regiment; one squadron, 28th Air Regiment and 31st Independent Reconnaissance Squadron. Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 22-3.
88. One reconnaissance company also made the move to Menado. Washi Sakumei Ko Dai Rokuju-go (2d Air Division Order A, No. 60) 22 Aug 44.
89. Principal units operating under the 7th Air Division at this time were: 3d Air Brigade (13th Fighter Regiment and 75th Light Bomber Regiment); 9th Air Brigade (24th Fighter Regiment and 61st Heavy Bomber Regiment); two reconnaissance squadrons. (1) Ibid. (2) Philippine Air Operation Record, Phase Two, op, cit., p. 23.
90. Nihon Kaigun Hensei Suii oyobi Heiryoku Soshitsu Hyo (Tables Showing Organizational Changes and Losses of Japanese Naval Forces) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 49, pp. L-31-2.
91. (1) Ibid., pp. L-31-3. (2) Teikoku Kaigun Senji Hensei (Wartime Organization of the Imperial Navy) Navy General Staff, Vol. II, 15 Aug 44, p. 32. (3) At the same time the service units of the 26th Air Flotilla had been organized as the Philippines Airfield Unit.
92. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., p. 30.
93. Wartime Organization of the Imperial Navy, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 32.
94. The 153d, 201st and 761st Air Groups had a total strength of about 400 aircraft, only about half of which were in operational condition. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 32-3.
95. Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.
96. The "T" Attack Force was so designated because of its ability to fight even in adverse weather. The letter "T" stood for taifu, the Japanese word for "typhoon".
97. Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p. 3.
98. (1) Daikairei Dai Sanjuichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 31) 24 Jul 44. (2) Dairikumei Dai Senhachiju-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1080) 22 Jul 44.
99. (1) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 5-8, 14-15, 33-9. (2) Dai Roku Kichi Koku Butai Meirei Saku Dai Roku-go Bessatsu (Supplement to Sixth Base Air Force Operations Order No. 6) 5 Sep 44. (3) Hito Homen Koku Sakusen ni kansuru Riku-Kaigun Genchi Kyotei (Army-Navy Local Agreement Concerning Philippines Air Operation) 1 Sep 44.
100. This Table of Assignments specified the types of Army and Navy aircraft to be employed for different purposes. Against enemy carriers, the Army Air force was to use only the Type IV bomber, while the Navy was to employ both land-based and carrier-borne bombers, torpedo planes and fighters. Against enemy transports, a variety of Army as well as Navy planes was to be used. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 15-6.
101. The 1st Carrier Division was composed of the newly-completed Unryu and Amagi, with the 601st Air Group providing the air complement. Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p. 69.
102. The 3d Carrier Division was reorganized on 10 August to consist of the carriers Chiyoda, Chitose, Zuiho and Zuikaku, with the 634th Air Group. The 4th Carrier Division was assigned the Ise, Hyuga, Junyo and Ryuho, with the 654th Air Group. Ibid.
103. Battleships were armed with 120 25-mm automatic cannons, cruisers with 80, and destroyers with 40. These numbers represented an increase of six to ten times the numbers of automatic cannon mounted on combat vessels during operations in the Solomons in 1942. Ibid., p. 37.
104. Transports carrying one infantry battalion of the 26th Division and one infantry battalion, three tank companies, and three artillery batteries of the 2d Armored Division were sunk by submarine attack during these movements. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 78 (chart).
105. Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 259-60.
106. The 26th Independent Infantry Regiment was added to Fourteenth Area Army order of battle on 20 July and moved from Manchuria to the Philippines early in September.
107. Responsibility for the defense of Batan Island was assigned to Southern Army on 1 September. Prior to that date, the operational boundary between the Southern Army and the Formosan Army ran between the Batan and Babuyan Islands, only the latter falling within Southern Army's zone. Dairikumei Dai Senhyakujuyon-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1114) 26 Aug 44.
108. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 24
109. Ibid., pp. 4, 7, 9, 15, 18.
110. This represented a modification of earlier estimates by Fourteenth Area Army. Strong probability was previously seen of a direct invasion of Luzon by American forces advancing from Saipan. (Interrogation of Col. Kobayashi, previously cited.)
111. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II Supplement, p. 4.
112. At the end of September, the status of the major airfield projects in the central and southern Philippines was as follows: The base at Bacolod, on Negros Island, was already completed, but because of poor drainage, its use could not be depended upon in the rainy season. The projected fields at Burauen, on Leyte, were about 90 per cent completed, while those at Davao and Del Monte, on Mindanao, were about 70 and 80 per cent completed, respectively. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
114. The 33d Infantry Regiment was retained on Luzon as strategic reserve under direct command of Fourteenth Area Army. Cf. p. 310.
115. When the 16th Division was assigned to the Leyte-Samar area in April, headquarters and two battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment were stationed on Samar. In July the regimental headquarters and one battalion were ordered back to Leyte, leaving only one battalion on Samar. 2d Battalion/9th Infantry Operations Order No. 97, 22 Jul 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1656, 28 DEC 44, p. 13.
116. At the time he assumed command, Lt. Gen. Suzuki estimated that the most probably target of the enemy's initial assault would be Davao, with the beaches along Leyte the next most likely landing spot. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II Supplement, pp. 7, 21-2.
119. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 38-9.
120. These coastal defenses consisted of a series of strong points built at strategic points along the coast between Palo and Abuyog. Lt. Gen. Makino,16th Division commander, ordered key emplacements to be constructed strongly enough to resist 15-cm howitzer shells.
121. This overall tonnage was broken down as follows: 300 rounds per rifle; 20,000 rounds per machine gun; 10,000 hand-grenades per division; 300 rounds per "knee" mortar; 1,500 rounds per 7.5 cm artillery piece. (Statement by Col. Ryoichiro Aoshima, Staff Officer (Line of Communications), Fourteenth Area Army.)
122. (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II Supplement, pp. 25-6. (2) Fourteenth Area Army Operations Orders. Published in XXIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XXIV CAET No. 7, 12 Nov 44. (3) Thirty-fifth Army Operations Orders. XI Corps ADVATIS Translations No. 38, 14 Jan 45.
123. The 166th Independent Infantry Battalion of the 100th Division, stationed around Cotabato, was not pulled back to Davao, but was transferred to 30th Division command and remained in the vicinity of Cotabato. (Statement by Col. Muneichi Hattori, Chief of Staff, 100th Division.)
124. The 55th Independent Mixed Brigade moved first from Luzon to Cebu, re-embarking there for Jolo. The last elements of the brigade reached Jolo on 5 October. (Statement by Maj. Tokichi Temmyo, Commander, 365th Battalion, 55th Independent Mixed Brigade.)
125. Statement by Col. M. Hattori, previously cited.
126. Dai Niji Sekai Taisen Ryakureki, (Otsu) (Abridged Chronicle of World War II, (B) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Mar 46, Part III, p. 17.
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Last updated 1 November 2006 |